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Abstract
In botany, garden and herbarium specimens have been used for purposes of systematic research since the mid-sixteenth century. The associated practices of collecting, exchanging and collating specimens were most influentially synthesized by Carl Linnaeus in the mid-eighteenth, although it should take roughly a century after Linnaeus’s death until they were formally canonized in international rules of nomenclature. The role of specimens and type-specimens in the history of natural history – a “metaphysics in action”, as Lorraine Daston calls it – has been discussed in a number of historical and philosophical studies in recent years. What has largely been overlooked, however, is the fact, that alongside the rise of the type specimen method, plants began to acquire another role in botanical research. In hybridization experiments, plants were increasingly used as tools to manipulate other plants, and the offspring resulting from these interventions as a kind of recording device to score the effects of hybridization. In my presentation I will look at select hybridisation experiments of the period to unravel the intricate relationship between natural historical and physiological concerns which governed this experimental practice.


Ever since the publication of Michel Foucault’s The Order of Things (1966), historians and philosophers of biology are used to draw a sharp line between natural history, with its descriptive approach, on the one hand, and experimental biology, with comparative anatomy, genetics and molecular biology as exemplary disciplines, on the other. Foucault’s original thesis of a chronologically well-defined, sharp break between natural history and biology around 1800 has not held water, to be sure. James F. Larson has demonstrated that eighteenth-century naturalists already developed theoretical and experimental agendas before 1800, with questions of acclimatisation and hybridisation occupying centre-place. And Peter F. Stevens has drawn attention to the fact that botanical and zoological systematics persisted beyond 1800 as large-scale, dynamic research programmes. What remains true of Foucault’s thesis, however, is that descriptive and experimental approaches were contrasted again and again by biologists themselves since the early 19th century. Soraya de Chadarevian has made this point with respect to the German plant physiologist Julius Sachs, and much of Ernst Mayr’s work can be interpreted as an attempt to restore natural history to its former dignity as a science. Both Sachs and Mayr have also written magisterial histories of their disciplines, and these have certainly contributed to the widespread impression, that “mere” natural history was just a preparatory stage in the history of the life sciences. While it provided important factual information about organisms, it contributed nothing to the explanation of organic phenomena.

In the following, I want to complicate this picture. What I want to argue is that both natural history and experimental biology share common ground in the prehistory of model organisms. Natural history did not operate on a purely contemplative basis. Its empirical basis was provided by institutions which did involve a deliberate transplantation, manipulation and reproduction of living organisms [slide 1]: Botanical gardens in the case of botany, menageries and zoos in the case of zoology. For reasons of expedience, I will focus exclusively on botany in the following, but the point I wish to make should also be valid for zoology. In order to represent species through exemplary specimens, botanists aimed for the production of lineages in their gardens that were controlled for genealogical descent and environmental conditions. By adopting such lineages for experimental purposes, biologists equipped themselves with a material that could be individuated and classified analytically. And this in turn was a crucial precondition for the adoption of mathematical and physico-chemical approaches in the life sciences. In other words, model organisms constituted a shadow world of artificial creatures – man-made, secular platonic forms, so to speak – which nevertheless stood in a definite relation to, and thus could tell something about the “real”, much more messy world outside botanical gardens and laboratories. For the first time in the history of life sciences, “typological” or “essentialist” thinking began to make sense at all. In will flesh this out in the following by focussing on Linnaeus and Mendel.

Linnaeus’s scientific agenda has often been described as mainly descriptive, with no or hardly any experimental concerns. This is not true. One of Linnaeus’s earliest publications, Musa Cliffortiana or “Clifford’s banana tree” from 1736, celebrated his success in bringing a banana tree to fruit by artificial means, soaking it in water and then raising the temperature in the hot-house [slide 2]. Incidentally, Linnaeus inverted Celsius original temperature scale in the process. The fruits obtained where a disappointment: although he described their taste as delicious, somewhere between marrow and honey, they did not contain seeds. In the 1750s Linnaeus repeated his experiment with two specimens, inducing them to flower at slightly different times. In bananas, female flowers develop slightly later than male ones [slide 3]. A single specimen, Linnaeus realized, could therefore not produce seed. But letting two specimens flower with an adequate time lag would allow for artificial pollination. This time around, Linnaeus got seed, but it proved to be sterile. He began to speculate that cultivated bananas were hybrids, which eventually turned out to be true.

Linnaeus must have engaged in hundreds of such experiments in his garden at Uppsala, and they clearly demonstrate his experimental skills. One in particular has caught the attention of historians. In 1758, Linnaeus castrated seed flowers of Tragopon pratensis (goatsbeard), dusted them with pollen from another species T. porrifolius, differing in flower colour and other trifling, but constant traits. He harvested the seeds that developed from these flowers, sowed them out in the following year, and obtained hybrids of an intermediate colour. Linnaeus performed the experiment in preparation of an answer to a prize question of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences asking for proofs of plant sexuality. He did not rest content with reporting his experiment to the Academy, but also sent along a sample of seeds of the hybrid, so that the jurors could test his claim of having produced a stable hybrid. This was a severe test, as local conditions in St. Petersburg could be expected to differ from those in Uppsala, so that a successful reproduction of the presumably hybrid characters there would prove their heritability, or “constancy”, as Linnaeus and his contemporaries put it.

Linnaeus hybridization experiment instigated a whole tradition of experimental research into hybridization. The first to take up the ball was Joseph Gottlieb Koelreuter, who was sceptical of Linnaeus’ claims, and indeed found that his Tragopon-hybrid proved unstable by segregating in later generations. Koelreuter, but also other hybridists, like Charles Naudin and Carl Friedrich Gärtner, worked with large numbers of varieties and species. From today’s perspective, this seems a long way from working with model organisms. Yet two crucial conceptual innovations occurred in this context which prepared the way for model organisms. First, species became redefined as what James Larson has called “agent[s] of formation.” What mattered for species membership was not so much similarity, nor even the ability to generate fertile offspring, but rather that the respective organism reacted in determinate ways to inorganic factors, or, in organic reproduction, with other species. What came to matter, was specificity, rather than species in the traditional sense. The second conceptual innovation was the establishement of analytical classifications of hybrids, classifications, that is, which started from pure species in the sense just spelled out, and then classified hybrids exclusively according to their “composition and descent”, rather than external features.

Both innovations were crucial presuppositions for the way in which Mendel constructed and interpreted his experiments, as I have argued elsewhere [slide 4]. They allowed him to generate quantifiable results through classifying and counting hybrid offspring unambiguously, and to draw conclusions from external features to underlying genetic constitutions. Mendel added an important twist by restricting himself to a few, well-chosen character pairs of a single species only. Arguably, therefore, Mendel’s achievement was not so much that he discovered some empirical law, nor that he found out something about the evolution of hybrids. What Mendel achieved was nothing less than the invention of a powerful experimental system, in which plants not only served as ideal devices for recording the effects of manipulations, but also as the precision tools with which manipulations were carried out. As R. A. Fisher pointed out succinctly, Mendel demonstrated “the truth of [the] factorial system […] and the precision with which [it] worked.”

In conclusion, let me come back to the relationship between natural history and exeperimental biology. It might be argued, that the connections I have pointed to are rather accidental, and that analytically, at least, a distinction between descriptive and experimental approaches still holds. I sympathize with that perspective. Nevertheless, I think it is worthwhile to recognize the grey zone that lies between natural and experimental history, as Bacon would have called it. The very time that saw the term biology being coined was also a time in which classical natural history was applied on an unprecedented scale to the agricultural, horticultural, and industrial “improvement” of nations. I recently wrote a paper on the life sciences at Berlin University in the first three decades after its foundation in 1810. It turns out that all the achievements, that this university is famous for – the early development of cell theory, Dubois Raymond’s electrophysiology, Helmholtz’ psychophysics – started out as small research niches in large-scale projects for the “improvement of the Prussian lands”, for which the botanical garden and anatomical museum in Berlin served as central hubs. Creatures populating artificial environments like gardens, hothouses and fields were not at all alien to natural history, and thus there was always an experimental side to it. The uses of organisms, actual or potential, moreover, were always at the horizon of natural history. Experimental biology, on the other hand, for all the generality it can claim occasionally for its results, is always stuck with experimental objects, which are of a highly specific nature. Description and classification, as Robert Kohler has demonstrated so nicely for the Morgan group, will therefore always remain on the agenda of the experimental branches of biology.
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